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Abstract:  Internet service providers (ISPs) play 
a pivotal role in contemporary society because they 
provide access to the Internet. The primary task of ISPs 
– to blindly transfer information across the network – 
has recently come under pressure, as has their status 
as neutral third parties. Both the public and the private 
sector have started to require ISPs to interfere with 
the content placed and transferred on the Internet as 
well as access to it for a variety of purposes, including 
the fight against cybercrime, digital piracy, child por-
nography, etc. This expanding list necessitates a criti-
cal assessment of the role of ISPs. This paper analyses 
the role of the access provider. Particular attention is 
paid to Dutch case law, in which access providers were 
forced to block The Pirate Bay. After analysing the posi-
tion of ISPs, we will define principles that can guide the 
decisions of ISPs whether to take action after a request 
to block access based on directness, effectiveness, costs, 
relevance and time.
A. Introduction
1 Traditionally, third parties facilitating communica-
tion and information exchange were mere messen-
gers or neutral transporters. As a popular Dutch say-
ing goes,1 their policy should be to not take notice 
of the content of messages. Postal services do not 
open letters, telephone companies do not eavesdrop 
on communication, and even classic telephone ope-
rators simply facilitated the connection. Only with 
some services is knowledge of the content inherent, 
as in the case of telegrams and telex.
2 In the early days of the Internet, ISPs still fit into 
the tradition of communication neutrals. From the 
moment Internet access was provided to the gene-
ral public in the early 1990s, however, crime slowly 
started to take off, and copyright infringements in 
particular increased quite exponentially. These de-
velopments led to a changing role for Internet ser-
vice providers. No longer could they maintain a com-
pletely neutral position.
3 The initial attempts to regulate ISPs, with the pro-
minent examples of the US Digital Millennium Co-
pyright Act (DMCA)2 and the European Union Direc-
tive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce (Directive 
on E-commerce),3 reflected a new dual role of In-
ternet intermediaries: they deserved protection as 
neutrals, but they could also be called upon to as-
sist with norm enforcement. The underlying reason 
for these regulations, however, was primarily to de-
fine exceptions or safe harbours that would protect 
ISPs against liability claims. Nevertheless, these laws 
also acknowledged that, under certain circumstan-
ces, ISPs should assist in stopping copyright infrin-
gements, for example.
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4 Both the DMCA and the Directive on E-commerce4 
regulated three types of ISP services: the transport, 
temporary storage, and hosting of information. In 
addition, the DMCA also regulated search engines. 
Presently, there is a tendency to put pressure on 
ISPs to co-operate in addressing norm violation, in 
particular in their role as access provider. For in-
stance, courts in several countries (Netherlands, Fin-
land,5 UK,6 etc.) ordered ISPs to filter Internet traffic; 
the French HADOPI Act has a so-called three-strike 
policy regarding downloading; and the controver-
sial ACTA is infringing on human rights in a serious 
way.7 The secrecy surrounding this last initiative ad-
ded to the controversy regarding its content. Much 
media attention was also paid to the US initiatives 
SOPA and PIPA.8 These initiatives were abandoned 
in February 2012, but by April 2012 the comparable 
CISPA had already passed in the House of Represen-
tatives.9 Since the Senate did not accept the CISPA, 
it was re-entered and passed again in April 2013.10
5 Are the times changing? Are we entering a new era? 
This paper aims to answer this question by focusing 
the discussion on ISPs in their role as the access pro-
vider.11 The paper is structured as follows: In section 
2 the liability exemptions of the US DMCA and the 
EU Directive on E-commerce are introduced. Next, 
we will discuss a series of Dutch court cases concer-
ning The Pirate Bay that ended in 2012 with court 
orders against several ISPs to filter out websites be-
longing to Pirate Bay. In the third part we will eva-
luate which role fits access providers best. Viewed 
from different angles, the access provider as the in-
termediary merely providing access to the Internet 
will be weighed against the access provider as a full-
time norm enforcer, and we will provide principles 
that can help in striking a balance.
B. Early days: DMCA and 
Directive on E-commerce
6 The spirit of the mid-1990s is well reflected by Kas-
persen:12 ‘(…) the duties of access-providers do not 
embody anything else but giving access to the Net 
and all the information in it, just as it is’.
7 Stated simply, an access provider should just provide 
access to the Internet. This basically was the back-
ground of the legislation proposed during the late 
1990s, although besides this main focus on creating 
a safe harbour it was also acknowledged that under 
certain circumstances ISPs should assist in comba-
ting (in particular copyright) infringements. 
I. DMCA
8 Prior to the DMCA, in 1996 Section 230 of the Com-
munications Decency Act regulated immunity for 
ISPs and others regarding hosted content.13 For the 
present paper with its focus on access providers, this 
controversial and much-debated Act14 is not directly 
relevant.
9 On December 1998 the DMCA entered into force. 
This Act included in Title II the addition of para-
graph 512 to the US Code, better known as the On-
line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 
(OCILLA). OCILLA defines four categories of exemp-
tions applicable to ISPs: services related to (1) infor-
mation location tools (search engines), (2) storage of 
information at the direction of users (hosting), (3) 
system caching and (4) transitory communications.15 
The transitory communications category is relevant 
for the present paper since it concerns ‘transmit-
ting, routing, or providing connections’. Whereas in 
doctrine, access providers are normally distinguis-
hed as a special category of providers, in regulation 
this is not necessarily the case. Although all types of 
transitory communication providers are crucial to 
a proper functioning of the Internet, the doctrinal 
treatment of access providers as a single category is 
understandable. For anyone on the Internet, it al-
ways starts with getting access. 
10 Instead of enforcing norms on the Internet – regula-
ting behaviour in cyberspace – it is sometimes easier 
to control at the source: make sure that people never 
get to (parts) of the Internet, or that people cannot 
use particular applications. As such, the ISP can func-
tion as a single point of contact for all of its users, 
and these users are regulated at a single instance. 
Access providers are the gate to the virtual world, 
and consequently are an obvious party to appoint 
as norm enforcer or gate keeper. As Mann & Belzey 
state:16 ‘Internet intermediaries (…) are easy to iden-
tify and have permanent commercial roots inside 
the jurisdictions that seek to regulate the Internet.’
11 As a shelter for such claims, the DMCA/OCILLA de-
termines that the transitory communication pro-
vider is not liable if (1) the provider does not initi-
ate the access, (2) the process is automatic without 
selection of the material, (3) the provider does not 
determine recipients, and (4) the information is not 
modified. Besides these topics related to the core 
activity of an ISP, OCILLA sets two other conditions: 
(5) providers should have a policy of account termi-
nation of repeat infringers and (6) should not inter-
fere with technical measures (e.g. Digital Rights Ma-
nagement software).
12 Access providers almost intrinsically satisfy all these 
conditions expect for the fifth. Basically, in a normal 
course of action, access providers cannot be held li-
able as long as they define and apply a policy of ac-
count termination. The above applies to monetary 
relief. There are some circumstances under which 
injunctive or other equitable relief is possible,17 and 
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we will discuss them after introducing the E-com-
merce Directive.
II. Directive 2000/31/
EC on E-commerce
13 The E-commerce Directive was drafted against a 
different background than the DMCA. The opening 
words of the proposal for the E-commerce Direc-
tive are illustrative: ‘Electronic commerce offers 
the Community a unique opportunity for economic 
growth, to improve European industry’s competi-
tiveness and to stimulate investment in innovation 
and the creation of new jobs.’18
14 This Directive formed the central pillar in the regu-
lation of e-commerce within the EU, as was outli-
ned in a policy document from 1997.19 As part of the 
same legal package, Directive 2001/29/EC on copy-
right in the information society is more directly re-
lated to the DMCA, but it did not cover liability:20 
‘Liability for activities in the network environment 
concerns not only copyright and related rights but 
also other areas, such as defamation, misleading 
advertising, or infringement of trademarks, and is 
addressed horizontally in Directive 2000/31/EC (…) 
on E-commerce.’
15 In the proposal for the E-commerce Directive, the 
European Commission identified five key issues, re-
ferred to as obstacles. One of them concerned the 
liability of intermediaries: ‘To facilitate the flow of 
electronic commerce activities, there is a recog-
nised need to clarify the responsibility of on-line 
service providers for transmitting and storing third 
party information (i.e. when service providers act as 
‘intermediaries’).’21
16 The angle is basically economic. The aim is to stimu-
late e-commerce within the European Union by pro-
tecting ISPs against liability, thus preventing them 
from being hindered by all kinds of liability claims 
when providing their services. Nonetheless, the Di-
rective on E-commerce22 takes a similar approach, 
and as McEvedy correctly observes23 ‘closely resem-
bles the DMCA in that it provides “limitations of lia-
bility” while leaving the underlying law unaffected’. 
The scope of the E-commerce Directive is broader, 
in that it covers all legal fields, not only copyright. 
Surprisingly, the proposal for the E-commerce Di-
rective does not mention the DMCA, but in certain 
parts it follows it almost verbatim.
17 The E-commerce Directive’s well-known triad of 
services provided by ISPs is mere conduit (Article 
12), caching (Article 13) and hosting (Article 14). At 
first sight it may seem that the role of access provi-
ders is left unregulated. However, just as the DMCA 
covered access under ‘transitory communications’, 
the mere conduit of Article 12 regulates not only 
‘the transmission in a communication network’ but 
also ‘the provision of access to a communication net-
work’. The proposal also clearly indicates the dif-
ferent scope depending on the provider’s role: ‘es-
tablishes a “mere conduit” exemption and limits 
service provider’s liability for other “intermediary” 
activities’.24 
18 In order to be not held liable, the access provider 
should not (a) initiate the transmission, (b) select 
the receiver of the transmission and (c) select or mo-
dify the information contained in the transmission. 
For an access provider, this set of conditions is even 
easier to comply with than the six conditions of the 
DMCA/OCILLA just discussed.
III. Court orders and 
other observations
19 The fact that mere transmission and providing ac-
cess are headed under the same category can be con-
sidered an underestimation of the role of access pro-
viders, as was indicated above. However, one could 
also argue that now that both the DMCA and the E-
commerce Directive take this approach, there must 
be a reason why these services should be judged 
similarly. If we proceed from this assumption, we 
could argue that intervention of access providers 
should be treated similarly to intervention by pro-
viders of servers that just pass IP packets through. It 
is hardly imaginable that such a provider that only 
transmits information over the Internet would ever 
be called upon. So, if this provider is headed under 
the same category as the access provider and never 
asked to assist with the enforcement of norms, why 
would the access provider be? 
20 An obvious difference between the two providers is 
that the access provider has a contractual relation-
ship with the user, while the provider merely passing 
through IP packets does not. However, the court ca-
ses discussed in this paper concern blocking access 
to certain sites, so the contractual relation is not re-
levant in that respect. Another difference has to do 
with the Internet infrastructure. If an access pro-
vider blocks access, this can be effective25 for their 
users, and for the other provider the effect is not gu-
aranteed. Moreover, all users worldwide could be af-
fected by the latter measure, whereas actions from 
the access providers affect only their users.
21 The safe harbors created for access providers by both 
the DMCA and the E-commerce Directive are not ab-
solute. The DMCA is different in that it has an explicit 
notice-and-take-down (NTD) procedure,26 and provi-
ders can be forced to reveal the identity of subscri-
bers. The E-commerce Directive has no explicit pro-
cedures. As a consequence, ISPs need to carefully 
Evaluation of the Role of Access Providers
2013 133 4
weigh the pros and cons after a complaint without 
the certainty of not being held liable by either the 
party complaining or the opposing party. For the 
present paper this is not directly relevant, since ac-
cess providers are never confronted with NTD re-
quests, at least not in their role as access providers. 
Identity requests ask difficult decisions of ISPs, and 
these requests go even beyond the classic roles of 
ISPs to include web 2.0 providers.27 Identity requests 
also fall outside the scope of the present paper.
22 An importance difference between the two regu-
latory frameworks is the way court orders are re-
gulated. Whereas the DMCA defines many condi-
tions that have to be met before a court can order 
an access provider to block certain content,28 the 
E-commerce Directive sets no specific conditions,29 
generally stating in Article 12(3): ‘This Article shall 
not affect the possibility for a court (…) requiring 
the service provider to terminate or prevent an 
infringement’.
23 This might explain why it is relatively easy to get a 
court order within the EU and hard to get one in the 
US. It might also explain why the tendency within 
the EU is for the entertainment industry to go to 
court, and in the US they focus on the introduction 
of new legislation. Illustrative are the Dutch court 
cases concerning The Pirate Bay, which we will dis-
cuss next.
C. Dutch case law or the 
Pirate Bay saga
24 In 2012 the Dutch anti-piracy organization BREIN, 
a foundation that aims to enforce intellectual pro-
perty rights for the entertainment industry, obtai-
ned several court orders that forced ISPs to block 
access to The Pirate Bay. The Dutch Pirate Bay ca-
ses nicely illustrate the legal grounds underlying the 
blocking of access by ISPs. Therefore, we will discuss 
the main arguments used in the various cases that 
started with court proceedings against The Pirate 
Bay in May 2009. 
I. BREIN v The Pirate Bay 2009-2010
25 The case against The Pirate Bay began well before 
the judge handed down its verdict in the Nether-
lands. Early in 2009, charges were filed in Sweden 
against the people behind The Pirate Bay, followed 
by a conviction of one year of imprisonment for 
Fredrik Neij, Gottfrid Svartholm, Peter Sunde and 
Carl Lundström on 17 April 2009.30 The criminal con-
viction in 2009 led to a court initiative by BREIN that 
sued the Pirate Bay people in the summer of 2009 for 
copyright violation.
26 The summons was delivered at the address as recor-
ded in the Swedish population register but was re-
turned. The defendants did not show up in court, but 
the judge allowed the proceedings to take place in 
absentia.31 This is allowed in summary proceedings 
if the plaintiff has put sufficient effort in trying to 
reach the defendant. It is interesting in this case that 
the effort consisted, amongst others, in sending the 
court order via e-mail, Twitter and Facebook (the 
plaintiff was de-friended minutes after the court or-
der was left on the Pirate Bay-owned Facebook page). 
The reaction of one of the defendants was decisive 
when the press confronted him with the upcoming 
court case: ‘Having a court case in Amsterdam on 
July 21 does not ring a bell.’ 
27 In the 30 July 2009 verdict, the court ordered The 
Pirate Bay to
1. stop copyright infringements in the Nether-
lands and
2. make websites thepiratebay.org, piratebay.se, 
etc. inaccessible to Dutch users.
28 The verdict is somewhat ambiguous. What is proba-
bly meant by ‘Dutch users’ and ‘copyright infringe-
ments in the Netherlands’ is Dutch IP addresses. One 
could argue that if the websites mentioned are inac-
cessible in the Netherlands, copyright infringements 
are stopped as far as The Pirate Bay is concerned so 
the first order does not add anything. However, the 
reason for the first point might be that changing do-
main names will not work to undermine the second 
point. Clearly, if a proxy were used the second ban 
could be circumvented, allowing users to access The 
Pirate Bay and infringe copyrights.
29 After this verdict, Pirate Bay started summary pro-
ceedings against BREIN, arguing that due to the tech-
nical complexity, this case is not suited for summary 
proceedings. The judge indicated that despite the 
complexity, balancing the opposing interests of The 
Pirate Bay and BREIN remains possible. The result: 
The Pirate Bay did not violate copyrights, but the 
judge decided that the act of facilitating copyright 
infringements by others is illegal. The judge ordered 
the following on 22 October 2009:32
1. The Pirate Bay should delete all torrents that re-
fer to material that infringes on copyright ma-
terial relevant to BREIN.
2. The Pirate Bay should block access of Dutch In-
ternet users on the various Pirate Bay websites 
to the torrents under 1.
30 The idea behind this court order change was to al-
low references to material that does not infringe on 
copyrights of the parties BREIN represents. This is in 
favour of the freedom of speech as far as non-infrin-
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ging material is concerned. However, since the court 
orders the deletion of torrents, people not using a 
Dutch IP address would also no longer be able to ac-
cess them. In this respect the order reaches further 
than the previous court order. Another problem with 
the verdict is how The Pirate Bay can establish whe-
ther a torrent infringes on the copyright of the par-
ties BREIN represents.
II. Intermezzo: International 
hosting providers
31 The Pirate Bay did not follow the court order, so 
BREIN turned to the access providers. In previous 
court cases in other countries, The Pirate Bay hos-
ting providers had been sued. First, the Swedish 
courts decided that hosting The Pirate Bay was not 
allowed. The Pirate Bay was offline for a couple of 
days but then reappeared on German servers. The 
German judge also ordered a cessation of hosting 
The Pirate Bay. The race to the bottom stopped in 
Ukraine, which has hosted the Pirate Bay servers 
since then. In addition to the fact that suing in Uk-
raine would not necessarily have the same results as 
in Sweden and Germany, it became clear that even 
winning in Ukraine would only mean that The Pirate 
Bay would seek yet another country to host their 
websites.
III. BREIN v the largest ISP, 
summary proceeding 2010
32 Based on this verdict, BREIN asked Dutch providers 
to filter out Pirate Bay Internet traffic. The provi-
ders did not grant this request. Therefore, in what 
they called a test case, BREIN decided to sue only the 
ISP that facilitated the most Pirate Bay traffic. This 
appeared to be Ziggo. On the grounds of principle, 
XS4ALL joined Ziggo as a defendant in this case.33 
33 The subtlety of the 2009 verdict (not providing ac-
cess to infringing material) was replaced by BREIN 
and became mere access. In summary proceedings, 
BREIN applied the Dutch implementation of Article 
11 of Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (see also Article 8(3) Di-
rective 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the infor-
mation society):  ‘(…) rightholders are in a position to 
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose 
services are used by a third party to infringe an in-
tellectual property right (…)’.
34 The third party are the subscribers of the ISP. The 
judge did not grant the request, arguing that the in-
junction is allowed only in cases of direct infringe-
ment, and the order would apply to all users of the 
provider, not only those infringing copyrights af-
ter accessing The Pirate Bay. This ruling is a bit odd: 
people who do infringe are banned, and people who 
do not infringe did not go to The Pirate Bay anyway. 
The argument could be that those who do not use 
The Pirate Bay might want to go there for lawful ac-
tivities as well. However, in practice most, if not all, 
Pirate Bay users go there to obtain copies of works 
violating copyright.
IV. BREIN v the largest 
ISP, proceedings on the 
merits 2010-2012
35 In the proceedings on the merits that BREIN started 
after they lost the summary proceedings, they ba-
sically claimed the same.34 The judge followed the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling from 12 July 
201135 (L’Oreal v eBay), and stated that Article 11 of 
Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights can also be used to prevent in-
fringements. In a later case (Scarlet v Sabam) on 24 
November 2011,36 the ECJ indicated that active mo-
nitoring for illegal content cannot be asked from ac-
cess providers. 
36 This last decision is interesting, since the Dutch 
judge’s verdict in the summary proceedings asked 
precisely this from the providers XS4ALL and Ziggo. 
If this verdict were to be translated to ISPs, it would 
not be allowed according to the Scarlet v Sabam case. 
However, since BREIN chose a different strategy, in 
which it requested the mere banning of domain na-
mes and IP addresses, this EU court ruling could not 
be applied directly. This actually means that because 
BREIN claimed too much (hence also blocking le-
gal Internet traffic), the active monitoring prohibi-
tion could be circumvented. Blocking websites or IP 
addresses of The Pirate Bay is ordered from the ISPs. 
37 On the subsidiarity question, the judge in the sum-
mary proceedings indicated that at least suing some 
consumers – i.a. because they could then have the 
opportunity to defend their position – could be asked 
from BREIN. Now the judge indicated that this was 
not necessary, and that after the lawsuits against 
The Pirate Bay and the hosting providers, the logi-
cal next step concerned access providers.
38 On the proportionality question, the judge indica-
ted that given the amount of illegal opposed to legal 
content, the interests of the copyright holders out-
weigh the interests of the ordinary Internet users. 
Still, the blocking of access to the complete website 
is less proportional than what was previously orde-
red by the court: not providing access to illegal ma-
terial. Interestingly enough, downloading music and 
movies is allowed in the Netherlands, but uploading 
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of infringing material is illegal. Most – though not 
all – users do both on a torrent site.
39 During the proceedings, BREIN claimed that blocking 
had been effective in Denmark and Italy. Still, it is 
easy to circumvent the blocking, and the people who 
really want to use The Pirate Bay can do so. Interes-
tingly enough, research carried out by the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam showed no difference in Pirate 
Bay Internet traffic after the ban.37
40 The judge briefly addressed whether the current 
measure was necessary in a democratic society (cf. 
Article 10 ECHR). He referred to the proportiona-
lity and subsidiarity considerations just discussed, 
in particular regarding the interests of the subscri-
bers in relation to the copyright holders. One might 
claim that the necessity considerations should at 
least include how the entertainment industry ope-
rated during the last 15 years.38 Another point that 
could have been covered is what role access pro-
viders should have on the Internet. The outcome 
might still have been the same, but it would have 
been better grounded.
41 The judge ordered Ziggo and XS4ALL to block a list 
of 24 websites (of which several were outdated at 
the time of the verdict, and others later became out-
dated), as well as three IP addresses. It is curious 
that BREIN was granted the right to change the list 
anytime they believe it is necessary, without judici-
ary intervention. One could argue that the judge did 
not really take notice of the particular sites anyway, 
but in a trial opponents have the opportunity to ob-
ject. Ziggo and XS4ALL now have to start a new trial 
if they do not agree with a particular IP address or 
website. If they do not comply, they have to pay a 
daily fine. The verdict does not pay attention to pos-
sible errors on BREIN’s side.
42 Both Ziggo and XS4ALL have appealed, but a decis-
ion is not expected before the end of 2013.
V. BREIN v other ISPs 2012/5-
43 Based on the verdict, BREIN asked other ISPs to vo-
luntarily start blocking The Pirate Bay. Since the 
ISPs refused, BREIN started new proceedings against 
other big providers, including KPN, UPC, T-Mobile 
and Tele2.39 The verdict is lengthy but does not add 
much. A difference from the original verdict is that 
BREIN is not allowed to change the list of sites and 
IP addresses. The Pirate Bay has over 100 different IP 
addresses and has already announced that it might 
add one IP address at a time, meaning that BREIN 
would have to start over one hundred different pro-
cedures. Maybe, this Pirate Bay policy can change 
subsequent verdicts on this point.
44 One interesting observation is on the effectiveness 
of the blocking. The ISPs introduced the previously 
mentioned research by the University of Amster-
dam40 showing that the blocking did not have any 
effect. The judge stated: ‘[B]locking as such does not 
necessarily lead to less Pirate Bay traffic, but effec-
tively combating infringements is possible only if 
this blocking is combined with other measures’.
45 This is a somewhat curious observation, in particu-
lar since one of BREIN’s claims from the beginning 
has been that the blocking has at least some effect 
and as such contributes to fighting copyright infrin-
gements. Therefore, the argument is that the mea-
sures are a necessary element that works in com-
bination with other measures. One of those other 
measures is to forbid proxy servers. In the course of 
2012, BREIN sued a series of organizations and peo-
ple that offered proxy servers, and did so ex parte.41 
One of the controversial cases was against the politi-
cal Pirate Party. Although legally interesting and so-
cially relevant, these cases are not within the scope 
of the present paper since it does not concern ac-
cess providers.
D. What role fits access 
providers best?
46 The decisions discussed above are certainly not ex-
clusive to the Netherlands. On 1 May  2012, the High 
Court in the United Kingdom ruled that the major 
ISPs in the UK must block access to The Pirate Bay. 
As the providers themselves noted, they do not want 
to be the judge and the jury of online content. Co-
pyright-infringing material is the prime example of 
content ISPs are asked to intervene with and cen-
tral in this paper. 
47 The interest in ISPs commenced before the DMCA 
and Directive on E-commerce were enacted. Back 
in 1995, ISPs were considered to be the party most 
suited to control the dangers of the Internet; in fact, 
‘a task force created by President Clinton suggested 
imposing strict liability on ISPs’.42 Moore & Clayton 
capture the complexity of ISP liability,43 but recog-
nize how ‘(…) ISPs are in an unrivalled position to 
suppress content held on their systems’.44
48 Before answering what role best fits the access pro-
vider, we will discuss ISP liability both related to In-
ternet traffic (spam, cyber security) and concerning 
content (defamation, privacy breaches, child porn).45 
For each of these topics we will introduce a rule of 
thumb that can help ISPs in their decision whether 
to comply with a request.
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I. Cyber security and spam: 
ISPs take initiative 
49 In the field of cyber security, ISPs have realized over 
the years that it is in their best interest to act. The 
same is true for spam. If ISPs did not use spam fil-
ters, probably no one would use e-mail any longer. 
Can ISPs still claim to be neutral if they actively act, 
as in filtering spam or eliminating malware?
50 In a famous Dutch case, the Supreme Court jud-
ged on the position of an ISP in the case of spam.46 
XS4ALL asked the direct marketer Ab.fab to stop sen-
ding spam to their customers. Ab.fab did not. Some 
argued that ISPs would lose their neutral position 
should they be allowed to reject messages. The Su-
preme Court decided that an ISP had the right to ask 
a party to stop sending spam.47 The basic argument 
was that a provider is the owner of the mail server, 
and if the provider has good reason to not want to 
process specific mails, the provider does not have 
to. Ab.fab was ordered to stop sending e-mail. Iro-
nically, before the Supreme Court ruled, Ab.fab had 
already gone bankrupt. The principle question still 
stood, however: Does the nature of the Internet and 
the role of ISPs in it conflict with asking a company 
not to send unsolicited email? As with all rules or 
principles, exceptions apply. To draw a parallel, if a 
football stadium is open to the general public, some 
people causing trouble might be banned from the 
stadium. After such a measure, the stadium is still 
open to the general public. In the case of ISPs, cer-
tain traffic can be banned from their servers without 
ISPs losing their neutrality. A similar argument ap-
plies to malware and other security measures.
51 In 2004, Lichtman and Posner called for an increased 
liability, and claimed that since ISPs are largely im-
mune from liability, they have no incentive to act.48 
Harper attacked this proposal by pointing at a fun-
damental flaw: ‘[I]t places efficiency ahead of justice. 
The Internet is a medium, not a thing, and the sup-
ply of access to it is peculiarly unsuited to a liability 
rule like Lichtman proposes.’49 
52 Nonetheless, Lichtman and Posner’s position has 
been supported by the United Kingdom House of 
Lords Science and Technology Committee, for ex-
ample, which stated in 2007 that ‘(…) although ISPs 
could easily disconnect infected machines from their 
networks, there is no incentive for them to do so’.50 
53 Others echo similar notions. Chandler writes: ‘The 
parties best placed to address cyber insecurity, in-
cluding (…) ISPs (…) do not face the full consequences 
of their contributions to cyber insecurity. Accordin-
gly, they do not invest time and money to the soci-
ally optimal level of improved security’.51 
54 Van Eeten & Bauer challenge this assumption: ISPs 
may ‘(…) unwittingly reinforce the impression that 
they have few if any incentives to improve the se-
curity of their services’.52 This occurs through the 
resistance of ISPs to government intervention and 
the hesitance to surrender self-regulation. The resis-
tance to government intervention is interpreted by 
many as an unwillingness to provide more security; 
yet this is an incorrect conclusion according to Van 
Eeten & Bauer. The efforts made by ISPs to improve 
the security of their clients started to escalate du-
ring the last decade when ISPs began to understand 
how improved security turned out to be in their best 
interest. This is due to costs associated with the in-
security of their clients.
55 As follows from the above discussion on spam and 
cyber security, ISPs do take initiatives that in them-
selves go beyond the neutral role of mere transport 
because they influence their core activities. Both 
spam and malware directly negatively influence the 
(access) services. Their aim is to guarantee a pro-
perly functioning Internet, in particular access that 
is not hindered by unwanted (spam) and the undesi-
red (malware) activities of others. This is what jus-
tifies their actions. The more these actions by ISPs 
are related to their core activities, the less influence 
such actions have regarding their neutral position. 
In the end it should be the decision of the ISP, and 
not one imposed by government, for example. Be-
cause the decision is up to the ISP, and what they do 
is objectively good for their users, they can uphold 
their basic neutral position.
II. Requests related to content: 
child porn, defamation and 
right to be forgotten
56 If ISPs have no incentive, external pressure could 
work. Access providers are in a position to influence 
what is communicated over the Internet.
57 One should be very cautious in asking assistance 
from ISPs. The fact that it is technically possible 
does not make it legally desirable. Let us assume that 
there is a public meeting room in a building that is 
hired by a politically motivated group of people. Du-
ring this meeting, a defamatory poster is put on the 
wall. Some of the attendees inform the person who is 
defamed by the poster. He goes directly to the mee-
ting and asks the people in the room to remove the 
poster. They do not. The defamed person goes to the 
owner of the room to ask for removal of the poster. 
If the owner chooses not to do so, can he be held li-
able? This is a very difficult decision for the third 
party to make. He has to balance freedom of expres-
sion against its possible defamatory nature. Whilst 
this situation is already difficult to navigate, what 
about the owner of the meeting room being asked to 
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III. Copyright infringement: 
external and preventive actions
61 A couple of years ago the discussion focused on the 
necessity of increased liability for ISPs; currently 
ISPs are just asked to carry out certain actions. The 
Dutch lawsuits by BREIN discussed above are a prime 
example, as is the French HADOPI law.58 The back-
ground of HADOPI’s ‘three strikes and you’re out’, 
introduced in 2009, is fighting copyright infringe-
ments. ISPs play a central role; for example, after 
a first notice the ISP is to actively monitor the sus-
pect, and after the third ‘strike’ the person in ques-
tion is blacklisted. The provider of the violating user 
as well as other ISPs are to ban the user for a fixed 
period of up to one year. This means that instead of 
blocking content, the access provider is to cut off an 
individual from the Internet. Besides the potential 
conflict with human rights,59 this demands from the 
access provider the enforcement of norms that dia-
metrically oppose their core activity: providing In-
ternet access to people.
62 Of a different nature was the 2011 initiative invol-
ving some of the biggest American providers; wi-
thout any act or verdict, they voluntary agreed to 
become ‘copyright cops’.60 Probably these providers 
had reasons to act as such, but it puts their neutral 
role under pressure. It is difficult for these providers 
to claim that they do not have to co-operate due to 
their neutral position if asked by private parties or 
government to intervene, either repressively or pre-
ventively, in cases of digital piracy. 
63 There is an important distinction to be made here: 
on the one hand are ISPs acting voluntarily; on the 
other hand are ISPs being forced. Just as in cases 
of child porn, government should not force ISPs to 
block access, but ISPs may do it on their own initia-
tive. However, once you act freely, you can no lon-
ger claim to be neutral as far as similar content is 
concerned. Once ISPs are more than passively invol-
ved with the communication or the flow of informa-
tion, they cannot rely on the safe harbors created by 
law. This does not make them necessarily liable, but 
there is no longer an easy way out. The same is true 
for access providers: once you voluntary search for 
copyright violations, for example, third parties can 
ask you to do so, too.
IV. Statutes and judges
64 We discussed Dutch cases that led to various court 
orders forcing access providers to block The Pirate 
Bay. In contrast to what is currently happening 
within the EU, the US cannot count on the judiciary 
when it comes to blocking websites. The conditions 
as formulated in the DMCA/OCILLA, for example, 
are simply too difficult to meet. That is one reason 
block access to the room because of the poster? This 
is even more difficult to decide, for the impact is big-
ger. If entrance to the room is blocked, the people 
cannot have their meeting. This shows the indirect-
ness of access blocking. The first level is asking the 
person who put the content there to remove it, the 
second level is asking the same of the hosting ISP, 
and the access provider only enters at the third le-
vel. When a judge orders that access be blocked to a 
particular website or IP address, this represents an 
indirectness acceptable only as a last resort. But a 
judge should be hesitant even then, because the na-
ture of the Internet makes such measures both un-
der- and over-inclusive. 
58 Requests placed upon ISPs are often impractical and 
sometimes even illegitimate. The study carried out 
by Stol et al. on child pornography and Internet fil-
tering illustrates the difficult position of ISPs and 
the importance of solid legal analysis.53 As Stol et 
al. conclude, 
[f]rom the point of view of constitutional law it is not acceptable that 
the authorities make use of instruments without sound legal basis 
in order to reach an otherwise legitimate goal. If the legislature’s in-
tention is to designate the blocking of child pornography as a duty of 
the police, then this should be provided in specific legal jurisdiction.54 
59 It has been argued by Dommering55 that a sound le-
gal defense is impossible. The Dutch Constitution 
does not permit control in advance (censorship), 
and this filtering prevents the assessing of parti-
cular content. A rebuttal here is that the filtering 
takes place only on the basis of lists of websites and 
IP addresses where child porn was already found, so 
in this respect the control is afterwards and not pre-
ventive. However, the Internet changes very quickly, 
and lists become outdated fast. One can never be 
sure what exactly is filtered.
60 Privacy breaches are another content-related topic 
often taking place on the Internet. Also, the Internet 
hosts various outdated personal information or in-
formation one simply does not want to be confron-
ted with any longer. It is not always easy to get this 
information offline. In a recent proposal, the Euro-
pean Union introduced the right to be forgotten.56 
Again, ISPs are asked to co-operate, which is com-
plicated since they find themselves in the midst of a 
conflict of interest between freedom of speech and 
the right to privacy.57 The one who has published 
the information is the first point of contact, with 
the hosting provider coming second. One could ima-
gine that access providers would be asked to block 
certain content if these first two steps do not work.
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why the music industry is trying to get acts pushed 
through the American Congress. Basically, getting a 
bill passed is more difficult than convincing a judge. 
Judges are not elected in the Netherlands (and in 
most, if not all, EU countries), so judges do not have 
to take public opinion into account. The US legal in-
itiatives demonstrated that public opinion can influ-
ence the decision-making process of the legislature.
65 Recall that on 18 January 2012, over 7,000 websites, 
including Wikipedia and Google, successfully sta-
ged a blackout as a means to protest legislative ini-
tiatives introduced in both chambers of the United 
States Congress. These initiatives, the Stop Online 
Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Preventing Real Online 
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intel-
lectual Property Act (PIPA), both aimed to curb di-
gital piracy in the United States. The primary ob-
jectives of both bills was to promote prosperity, 
creativity, entrepreneurship and innovation by com-
bating the theft of US property. Or, as the Economist 
put it more bluntly, ‘[t]he bill aims to cut off Ameri-
cans’ access to foreign pirate websites by squeezing 
intermediaries’.61
66 Beside the general public’s opportunity to influence, 
focus is another difference between legislation and 
court cases. In court cases the focus is on a single 
actor (e.g. The Pirate Bay), which makes it easier to 
decide against him. Also related to focus, proposals 
for legislation are necessarily abstract, and likewise 
feel like more of a threat to the general public (e.g. 
it touches the whole Internet). One additional diffe-
rence we want to note is that politicians appear to 
feel more sympathy for the economic arguments of 
the entertainment industry than judges are expec-
ted to. Finally, public opinion can provide correction 
during the legislative process, whereas in court ca-
ses public opinion basically starts only after the de-
cision: only then does the outcome become clear.
67 The neutral position of access providers is no diffe-
rent when it comes to objecting against case law or 
against acts; only the means of maintaining that neu-
trality are different.
V. How to draw the line?
68 The list of requests access providers receive is long, 
so we are not able to discuss them all, such as data 
retention62 or online porn blocking.63 This expan-
ding list, both in terms of what to do and how to do 
it, forces the need to re-evaluate what is being asked 
from access providers.
69 There are two basic camps. One camp stresses the 
importance of Internet freedom, innovation, the 
neutral role of providers, protection of freedom of 
speech and privacy. The other camp also stresses 
innovation, protection of rights and fighting crime. 
And as with all discussions, there are intermediate 
positions. We do take a position in this debate, but 
as with all legal debates – and particularly in those 
concerning Internet governance topics – we empha-
size that there is no obvious right or wrong; instead, 
it is about balancing and weighing the pros and cons. 
In the fire of the discussion this is sometimes forgot-
ten, but with sensitive issues it is important to keep 
this in mind: arguments matter, not who is defen-
ding them.
70 In drawing the line between the circumstances un-
der which ISPs should be asked to cooperate and 
when it is better to leave them alone, at least the 
following should be taken into account.
71 First, consider the directness of the measure. In a 
way this is related to but not the same as the ques-
tion of subsidiarity: if other less burdensome actions 
are possible, they should be preferred. Directness 
also concerns how related the proposed action is to 
the activities of the ISP. The more direct, the sooner 
action might be asked from ISPs. For instance, if so-
meone wants to take material down, the first res-
ponse is to go to the one who put it there, next to the 
hosting provider, and third to the access provider.
72 Second, consider the effectiveness of the measure. 
Each action serves a goal, but if the goal is hardly 
reached, someone might take independent action 
anyway and therefore should not ask this from 
others. If a measure is merely symbolic or the ef-
fects are insignificant, access providers should not be 
asked to cooperate. Basically, the more effect a mea-
sure has, the sooner action might be asked from ISPs. 
It might be that what is asked for is so important that 
even the slightest effect is worth carrying out the ac-
tion. If that is the case, normally the action should be 
carried out unless the costs (not only financially) as-
sociated with the action are disproportional.
73 Third, consider the costs of the measure. This point 
is related to proportionality: the action should be in 
proportion to the severity of what is targeted. Again, 
the costs are not only financial but may also include 
effort or side effects. The lower the costs, the sooner 
action might be asked from ISPs. It may not become 
an argument in itself, or better, not the only argu-
ment. If an action scores badly on other aspects, and 
the only real argument is that it is easy for the ac-
cess provider to fulfil the request, the ISP should not.
74 Fourth, consider relevance as related to the history 
of the ISP. If an ISP has cooperated voluntarily in past 
requests, or has taken independent actions related to 
what the ISP is now being asked to do, it is harder to 
refuse assistance. The more related the past activi-
ties of the ISP are to what the ISP is now being asked 
to do, the sooner action might be asked.
Evaluation of the Role of Access Providers
2013 139 4
75 Fifth, consider the time element. Repressive actions 
do not concern censorship, whereas preventive ac-
tions do.64 If content is taken down, the action is 
clearly repressive and concerns only the content ta-
ken down. In the case of repressive action, blocking 
access to websites might even turn into censorship. 
This has to do with the dynamic nature of the Inter-
net. In the case of cybercrime, for example, assis-
tance in blocking traffic to particular websites (cf. 
the black-listing of servers sending spam) may also 
filter out legitimate e-mail. Therefore, any list of si-
tes blocked should be evaluated regularly.
76 Finally, and this is an overreaching element, ade-
quate safeguards should be in place. The points in-
dicated above already imply warranties. In addition, 
for any action asked from ISPs, there should be a 
sound legal ground. It is important to rule out arbi-
trariness. Judiciary intervention can also be part of 
the safeguards. For instance, at the wrong side of this 
boundary are black box lists of websites so that ISPs 
do not know what they are filtering or lists of web-
sites created without judicial intervention.
E. Concluding observations
77 In January 2012, a 10-year-old Dutch boy (and obvi-
ously many others) could no longer download legal 
software via his favourite website. This was not be-
cause the Court of The Hague had ordered two pro-
viders to block The Pirate Bay on January 11, or be-
cause SOPA, PIPA or ACTA had entered into force. 
Instead, it appeared that the US Department of Jus-
tice had taken the file-hosting site Megaupload off-
line. Ironically, or sadly, this was exactly one day af-
ter Wikipedia had staged a blackout to protest the 
SOPA and PIPA initiatives. 
78 The Megaupload case is an interesting example of 
the strong – or better: long – arm of the law. Peo-
ple (such as Kim Dotcom) were arrested by the FBI 
in New Zealand, amongst others. The link between 
Megaupload and the US was not clear. Sure, the In-
ternet is accessible all over the world, and informa-
tion on a website basically enters all jurisdictions.65 
The reason, however, for the US action was that the 
people behind Megaupload were accused of running 
an international criminal organization, not only fa-
cilitating copyright infringements but also launde-
ring money. This begs the question: Why ask dozens, 
hundreds, or maybe even thousands of access pro-
viders to filter out websites if one action against the 
provider of the website has the same result?
79 As the discussion of the Pirate Bay case revealed, it 
is not always easy to take a website offline. In the 
case of The Pirate Bay, successful court actions only 
led to shifting from hosting providers in one coun-
try to hosting providers in another country, lastly 
Ukraine.66 So the call on access providers is compre-
hensible. Under certain circumstances they could 
be asked to assist. In this paper we introduced rules 
of thumb that could help in deciding whether an ac-
cess provider should cooperate:
3. The more direct the requested action is, the soo-
ner action might be asked from ISPs.
4. The more effect a measure has, the sooner ac-
tion might be asked from ISPs.
5. The lower the costs, the sooner action might be 
asked from ISPs.
6. The more related the ISP’s past activities are to 
what the ISP is asked to do, the sooner action 
might be asked.
7. Repressive action is preferred over preven-
tive, and preventive action needs regular 
re-evaluation.
80 Notably, adequate safeguards should be in place, in 
particular a sound legal basis for action. From the US 
perspective, Lemley, Levine & Post stated:67
United States law has long allowed Internet intermediaries to focus 
on empowering communications by and among users, free from the 
need to monitor, supervise, or play any other gatekeeping or policing 
role with respect to those communications. Requiring Internet ser-
vice providers (…) to block access to websites because of their con-
tent would constitute a dramatic retreat from that important policy.
81 We hope that the appeal cases in the Netherlands 
have outcomes other than that of the first instance 
decisions. The US policy just described should be 
enforced (again) in the Netherlands as well as within 
other European Union countries. Access providers 
should not be forced to check lists of websites, IP 
addresses and the like, for it concerns the opposite 
of what their role should be: providing access. An 
intermediary basically helps to connect two parties. 
We should not shut down train stations when the ac-
tual threat is somewhere down the line; otherwise 
we are heading in a direction we do not want to go.68
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